Rent-Seeking in Invasive Species Regulation: The Case of Noxious Weeds

TitleRent-Seeking in Invasive Species Regulation: The Case of Noxious Weeds
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2008
AuthorsMin, H, Gopinath, M, Buccola, S, McEvoy, PB
JournalLand Economics
Pagination306 - 326
Date Published2008///
ISBN Number0023-7639
KeywordsAGRICULTURAL administration, AGRICULTURE & state, GAME theory, INVASIVE plants, NOXIOUS weeds, SOCIAL responsibility of business, STAKEHOLDER theory, STAKEHOLDERS, TRADE regulation, U.S. states, U.S. states -- Politics & government, UNITED States, UNITED States -- Administrative & political divisi

Many non-native weed pests of food, fiber, and nursery crops pose threats to the U.S. environment and agriculture. We focus on regulations controlling the spread of noxious weeds, and especially the determinants of regulatory differences across U.S. states. With a simple game-theoretic framework, we derive cross-state regulatory congruence as a function of ecological and agronomic characteristics and stakeholder lobbying through political contributions. Empirical results suggest ecological and agronomic dissimilarities drive large cross-state differences in noxious weed regulation. However, evidence of stakeholder interests is statistically and economically significant. Unlike in the seed industry, commodity producers do not favor regulatory uniformity. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]; Copyright of Land Economics is the property of University of Wisconsin Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)